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Alan Bogg*

“Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law”
Revisited

This article revisits the arguments in Brian Langille’s seminal law review article, “Labour
Law is a Subset of Employment Law.” Langille’s article was based upon two main claims:
(a) that (individual) employment law should be understood as the “set” and (collective)
labour law the “subset” of employment law (the primacy of employment law); (b) that
“public values” have priority over “private values” in the regulation of work (the primacy
of public values). These two claims were presented as mutually reinforcing in “Subset.”
Drawing on specific examples from UK and Canadian law, this article endorses the first
claim but rejects the second. Public and private values intersect in a multiplicity of ways.
It is too reductive to accord primacy to the “public”or the “private.” Employment law has
always been a hybrid discipline shaped by public and private law.
Dans le présent article, nous reprenons les arguments avancés dans le fameux article
de Brian Langille, « Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law .» Cet article présentait
deux arguments principaux : a) que le droit de l’emploi (individuel) doit être compris
comme « l’ensemble » et le droit du travail (collectif) comme le « sous-ensemble »
du droit de l’emploi (la primauté étant accordée au droit de l’emploi); b) que les
« valeurs publiques » ont la priorité sur les « valeurs privées » dans la réglementation
du travail (la primauté étant accordée aux valeurs publiques). Ces deux revendications
ont été présentées comme se renforçant mutuellement dans le « sous-ensemble .»
En s’appuyant sur des exemples spécifiques du droit britannique et canadien, nous
appuyons dans le présent article le premier argument mais rejetons le second. Les
valeurs publiques et privées se croisent de multiples façons. Il est trop réducteur
d’accorder la primauté au « public » ou au « privé .» Le droit de l’emploi travail a
toujours été une discipline hybride façonnée par le droit public et le droit privé.

*
Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol. I am very grateful to Bruce Archibald for
organizing this special issue, to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, and to Brian Langille
for having been such an interesting, supportive and generous interlocutor over many years. We have
often disagreed, but the disagreements have always been a friendly source of pleasure and illumination.
All errors are my own responsibility.
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Introduction
I. “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law”
II. The “Individual” and “Collective” in employment law: Employment
law as a basic foundation of labour law
III. The public and private in employment law: Enforcement
architectures
Conclusion: Employment law as a hybrid of private and public law

Introduction
When I was eight years old, the year that one of Brian Langille’s debut
pieces “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (“Subset”) was
published,1 I watched the horror film Salem’s Lot furtively through the
crack in a door left ajar by my mother. The film was terrifying. It was
an experience that stayed with me. Some decades later, I mustered the
courage to watch it again. Revisiting the film was a mistake. What had
seemed scary now appeared silly. In the intervening years, the terror had
dissipated. That is always the danger with revisiting treasured things.
Creative works sometimes make best sense in a particular time and place.
They may not age well.
Since 1981, there have been tectonic shifts in the world of work. This
has had a significant impact on our ways of understanding the discipline
of labour law itself, its normative goals and its regulatory instruments, and
its relationship with other compartments of the law. Have the arguments in
“Subset” endured so that they remain relevant and important today?
There are two basic claims in “Subset.” First, that (individual)
employment law should be understood as the “set” and (collective) labour
law the “subset” of employment law. This ordering gives employment
law structural priority over labour law. Second, that “public values” have
priority over “private values” in the regulation of work. Let us call these
arguments “the primacy of employment law” and “the primacy of public
values” respectively.
There is a great deal that needs unpacking here, and that will be
undertaken in section I. This section elucidates some of the arguments
1.

Brian Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 200.
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used by Langille to give structural priority to employment law as the “set,”
with labour law its “subset.” Some of those arguments are “pedagogical,”
based in the idea that there is an expositional virtue in according structural
priority to employment law. I suggest that these “pedagogical” arguments
are in fact rather weak and bound up with the concerns of a particular time
and place. They need to be supplemented by normative arguments.
Once we shift from the “pedagogical” to more normative ground,
some of the main arguments of “Subset” have certainly endured. In
particular, the normative arguments associated with “the primacy of
employment law” have endured well (though at the time they were made,
these arguments would have been regarded as provocative, heretical even).
Section II investigates these arguments. What I have called “the primacy
of employment law” highlights the indispensable role of individual rights
in supporting collective structures and institutions. These individual
entitlements have become increasingly important in new forms of work
such as gig work, where established trade union organization may not yet
have taken root. “Subset” is also attentive to the significance of enforcement
regimes in understanding the conceptual structure of employment law. I
build upon Langille’s discussion of enforcement in section III. Today,
enforcement in employment law is one of the most important regulatory
issues, at the heart of our disciplinary reflections, and “Subset” analysed
employment standards enforcement powerfully and presciently.
I am less persuaded by Langille’s argument for “the primacy of public
values,” though I imagine this claim would have been regarded as rather
less controversial than “the primacy of employment law” at the time it was
made. The distinction and comparison between public and private values
is far too complex to be reducible to a single metric, not least because there
are likely to be many public and private values at stake. By relegating
“private values,” we run the risk of overlooking the contributions that
private law doctrines and private law theory can make in improving the
lives of workers. Employment lawyers have tended to be sceptical about
private law as a technique for regulating work. Indeed, the private law
of contract was regarded as part of the regulatory problem. Historically,
contract law was an object of criticism. It was widely regarded as incapable
of regulating the personal work relation to protect the worker’s dignity
in circumstances of unequal bargaining power. This scepticism about
private law provided the justification for a special autonomous regime
of regulation—“labour law” or “industrial law” as it was first known—to
counteract the inequality of power that was otherwise obscured by the
doctrines of general private law. Recent developments in the enforcement
of labour rights suggest that “the primacy of public values” perspective
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has now outlived its usefulness. I conclude by suggesting that the spirit of
“Subset” would be better served by a rapprochement of the “public” and
the “private,” which reflects the deep character of employment law as a
hybrid discipline of both public and private law.
I. “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law”
“Subset” provides a basic enquiry into the coherence of a legal discipline:
how should we decide “whether a useful chunk of reality has been carved
out for examination?”2 “Subset” was one of Brian Langille’s debut pieces,
but it is a question that has recurred in his impressive body of work across
four decades of scholarly reflection. The problem of disciplinary coherence
is rarely treated as such a pressing problem in the domains of contract,
tort, unjust enrichment and the other basic compartments of private law.
Certainly, there are deep disagreements about the best theoretical account
of these domains. There is usually less controversy over whether “contract
law” or “law of torts” is an appropriate legal domain in the first place. Or
indeed whether a legal norm is properly described as a contract norm, or
a tort norm, and so forth.3 These matters are usually taken as relatively
uncontroversial, enabling the scholar to proceed to more interesting
questions about whether private law disciplines have an internal structure,
or if private law is intelligible in the light of instrumental or external
goals, or whether we should understand the basic structure of private law
in terms of rights (or some other fundamental legal category). Of course,
appearances can sometimes be misleading. Critical perspectives on the
basic domains of private law often interrogate their parameters more
vigorously, identifying the ways in which supposedly neutral private law
principles obscure the role of contract law in constituting, distributing,
enabling, or impeding the exercise of power in ostensibly “private”
relations. This deconstructive turn in scholarship may be effective in
debunking the idea that private law categories are reducible to a small
set of explanatory norms or principles. Yet these critical reflections rarely
penetrate the basic coherence assumption that envelops the compartments
of private law in doctrinally-oriented scholarship and legal practice.
By contrast, the coherence problem is more visible in “contextual” legal
disciplines such as labour law, or medical law, or family law. This is because
scholars in these domains face a different organizational problem to the
2.
Ibid at 200.
3.
Though compare discrimination law, and Khaitan’s enquiry into the identity of discrimination
norms: see Tarunabh Khaitan, “Prelude to a Theory of Discrimination Law” in Deborah Hellman &
Sophia Moreau, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
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private lawyers. They must identify the relevant spheres of social life that
are sufficiently important to warrant the systemization of different norms
drawn from (say) contract, tort, property law, or public law. In this respect,
these contextual disciplines are second-order disciplines, constructing
new norm-systems out of more basic first-order disciplinary buildingblocks. Families, work, and medicine are now well-settled contextual
domains. Perhaps this reflects the importance of these contexts to human
flourishing (and, more importantly, the damage to human flourishing that
results when things go wrong in families, work, and medicine).4 Even if
we take “work” as our relevant context as a “useful chunk of reality,” there
are many different ways of carving it up. Are we concerned with labour
as an activity or employment as a relation? Should we expand our focus
and examine the “law of the labour market” or “work law?”5 Perhaps we
should integrate an examination of anti-discrimination law and labour law
to expose the deeper gendered and racialized connections between these
two spheres?6 Or maybe “work” itself is too limiting so that we should
organize our norms in a new discipline of the “law of private resistance,”
which examines multiple sites of private domination in modern life such
as employment and housing?7
Of course, the scholar has the luxury of eclecticism. As Kit Barker
has emphasized, the demarcation of legal phenomena “depends entirely
upon how legislators, adjudicators, legal scholars and other participants
in legal systems think about these categories and, in particular, upon
whether or not they regard the distinction in question as useful in
illuminating the system’s practices.”8 The friction between these different
contextual demarcations—work, employment, labour market, productive
and reproductive labour, private domination—might be intellectually
productive in exposing phenomena that might otherwise remain hidden.
The work of the world (and litigating that in the courts) will continue to
be done however scholars decide to formulate contesting visions of legal
4.
For a discussion of “contextual” legal disciplines in these terms, see Alan L Bogg, “Labour, Love
and Futility: Philosophical Perspectives on Labour Law” (2017) 33:1 Intl J Comp Lab L & Ind Rel 7.
5.
On the “law of the labour market,” see Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour
Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). On “work law,” see Noah D Zatz, “Does Work Law
have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?” (2016) 91:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1081.
6.
Richard Michael Fischl, “Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law” (2007)
28:1 BJELL 163.
7.
For a thought-provoking discussion in these terms, see Harry Arthurs, “Labor Law as the Law of
Economic Subordination and Resistance: A Thought Experiment” (2013) 34:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J
585.
8.
Kit Barker, “Private law: Key encounters with public law” in Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen, eds,
Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3 at
19.
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reality. We aren’t required to sign up to a specific disciplinary vision on
an exclusive or permanent basis, and some experimentation and flexibility
could well be interesting and productive.
In “Subset,” Langille is not so concerned with this problem of context.
The relevant bit of the world is described as the “employment relationship”
(and Langille seems fairly relaxed about how to identify it). Were he to write
this piece today, he might be less relaxed about this. The last thirty years
have been marked by a growing sense of disenchantment that many work
relations are falling outside the “employment relationship” but represent
forms of self-employment that are highly precarious. Be that as it may, in
1981 his dominant focus was on how to organize and systemize the legal
norms that regulate the employment relationship so that they form a coherent
whole. As the title of the article suggests, Langille’s enquiry is directed at
the relationship between two bodies of law, “employment law” and “labour
law,” and the extent to which these two bodies of law can be treated as an
integrated and coherent set of norms. For Langille, “employment law”
describes the “law for the unorganized.”9 It encompasses a wide range of
statutory entitlements that regulate the working conditions of individual
employees: minimum wage, restrictions on hours of work, overtime rates,
paid holidays, and “just cause” dismissal protections. This is what Lord
Wedderburn once famously described in the UK context as the “floor of
rights.”10 It is focused upon individual statutory entitlements, allocated
to individual employees, and enforceable in courts or specialist tribunals
regardless of union membership or collective bargaining. “Labour law,”
by contrast, is the “law for the organized.” This encompasses the norms
and institutions of collective labour relations, administered by specialist
labour boards and labour arbitrators, interpreting autonomous legal
concepts such as “bargaining units” and “good faith bargaining.” While
Langille is anxious to avoid the charge that his argument is “a cry for
individual over collective rights,”11 it is easy to see how the elevation of
“employment law” as the general category (and “labour law” its “subset”)
creates the impression.
This analytical enquiry into a reconciliation between two discrete
bodies of norms has greater juridical resonance in the North American
context. In contrast to the UK, both the US and Canada were (and
remain) highly juridified legal systems, especially at the collective level.
Consequently, there was a distinctive, extensive and relatively autonomous
9.
Langille, supra note 1 at 200.
10. Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, 2nd ed (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971) at 39.
11. Langille, supra note 1 at 230.
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body of legal norms and adjudicative institutions, regulating trade union
organization, certification for collective bargaining, the administration
of collective agreements, and the right to strike. In the UK, by contrast,
collective bargaining law was lightly juridified and “individual employment
law” emerged as a substantial body of norms only in the mid-1970s.12
In modern UK treatises in the post-war period, it was conventional to
organize all norms within a single discipline called “labour law.”13 Labour
law encompassed both collective and individual norms, but with priority
accorded to collective topics such as collective bargaining, collective
agreements, and the right to strike. The choice of nomenclature, favouring
“labour law” over “employment law,” was generally understood as a
code signalling an ideological disposition favouring worker-protective
purposes. The pragmatist orientation of UK labour law might well have
regarded structural questions about the organization of legal norms as an
irritating scholastic distraction from the serious business of making the
world of work a better place. Let the focus be on organizing workers,
not legal norms. In certain respects, therefore, Langille’s preoccupation
in “Subset” could be viewed as a relatively parochial enterprise that was
relevant to North American labour lawyers and rather peripheral in the UK
context.
Langille’s claim that labour law is a “subset” of employment law
would also have been regarded as a highly provocative one, certainly to
UK lawyers. To modern eyes, the provocation is even more acute. For to
describe (collective) “labour law” as a “subset” of the more fundamental
juridical category of (individual) “employment law” brings with it
the suspicion that values of solidarity are being undermined by more
individualistic values. In short, does the descriptor “subset” denote a
political judgement that downgrades the collective dimensions of working
life? In an era of declining unionization, it is easy to see how this might be
a neuralgic point for labour lawyers.
Before we leap to condemnation, we should note Langille’s
characterization of employment law as the law for the unorganized “havenots.” In other words, these statutory norms were particularly important for
the most marginalized and precarious workers left outside the system of
collective bargaining coverage. For this reason, Langille’s proposed shift
in methodological priorities could be understood as a way of extending
12. This, of course, is the central point of “collective laissez-faire” as a juridical description of
British labour law, a term coined by Otto Kahn-Freund and developed by Wedderburn. For a discussion
of the trials and tribulations of collective laissez-faire, see Alan Bogg, “The Hero’s Journey: Lord
Wedderburn and the ‘Political Constitution’ of Labour Law” (2015) 44:3 Indus LJ 299.
13. See eg Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law, 6th ed (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
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the locus of solidarity to encompass the most disadvantaged workers in
the labour market who might otherwise disappear as subjects of protective
labour law. On this view, the “subset” argument might be the fulfilment of
labour law’s egalitarian mission, not its abnegation.
The devaluation of the collective dimension in work relations has
come to pass in recent decades in many countries, although that decline
can hardly be attributed to the activities of labour law scholars postulating
relations between norm-types.14 The “Subset” thesis, according priority
to norms for individuals, also seems to subvert the conventional view of
historical legal development. On this view, the emergence of collective
organization and political voice generated democratic pressures to
introduce worker-protective legislation for individual employees. The
enactment of individual entitlements by legislators is rarely an intellectual
response to a good philosophical argument about the theory of justice. It is
a response to collective mobilization by trade unions operating as political
pressure groups in the legislative process. By the same token, the decline
in collective strength has opened the way for a politics of deregulation. In
short, the stability of individual employment law has always depended upon
robust collective organization in the workplace and polity.15 By presenting
employment law as the “set,” there is a danger that we obscure this vital
aspect of the collective-individual interaction: the political dependence of
individual rights on collective worker strength in the legislative process.
This is an important reminder that intellectual enquiries into disciplinary
coherence are no substitute for empirically-grounded enquiries into the
political and industrial dynamics of labour power in workplaces and
legislatures. These reservations about downgrading the “collective” at an
intellectual level should not be dismissed lightly. This downgrading would
be music to the ears of many powerful corporate actors.
How relevant is Langille’s structural claim to labour lawyers today?
We can distinguish between “pedagogic” and “normative” arguments. I
would suggest that the “normative” arguments have endured better than
the “pedagogic” ones.16 Let us begin by considering the “pedagogic”
arguments. By “pedagogic,” Langille is suggesting that the dominance of
“labour law” in the Canadian legal academy had led to the marginalization
of employment law as a worthy object of legal study. This distorted the
14. It is a fact that has often been at the centre of “crisis” literature on the extinction of labour law as
a discipline. See eg Cynthia L Estlund, “The Death of Labor Law?” (2006) 2 Annual Rev Soc Science
105 [“The Death of Labour Law”].
15. Alan Bogg & Ruth Dukes, “The Contract of Employment and Collective Labour Law” in Mark
Freedland, ed, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 96.
16. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
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practical importance of employment law for a growing number of Canadian
employees, given that the many of those employees fell outside collective
bargaining at the time the piece was written. Restoring the scholarly
prestige of “employment law” prevented the neglect of a practically
important body of law, and one that was important to the most precarious
workers in the labour market. This restoration also enabled scholars to
examine the intersections between individual and collective legal norms.
This binocular vision could be important where, for example, an arbitrator
was required to interpret a collective agreement in the light of employment
statutes relevant to the individual dispute. As such, there is an expositional
virtue in centring the core of the discipline on “employment law” and its
individual rights.
These “pedagogic” arguments were undoubtedly important in
retrieving the “floor of rights” from intellectual obscurity in the UK too.
In a similarly “pedagogic” vein, Hugh Collins famously criticized the
dangers of “closure” in the disciplinary framing of UK labour law.17 The
intellectual dominance of “collective laissez-faire,” rooted in a sociological
orientation focused on the institutions and practices of collective labour
relations, inevitably generated criteria of importance and significance in
organizing the legal materials.18 These criteria marginalized alternative
perspectives on legal developments, for example theories of individual
political and social rights in the workplace.19 Collins’ intervention was an
important reminder that value judgements always underlie the selection
and organization of legal materials. Judgements of importance are
normative, and those judgements are inescapable once we are organizing
legal norms into a coherent and intelligible structure. Our duty as scholars
is to be methodologically explicit in making those evaluative choices.20 We
should be particularly sensitive to what is positioned on the periphery of
the discipline, and the social and political consequences of that marginality.
Few would deny that individual employment law should be taken
seriously as a compartment of the law regulating work relations. Yet
its marginalization could be countered by treating “labour law” and
“employment law” as co-equal elements of a law of work relations or “work

17. Hugh Collins, “The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law” (1997) 26:4 Indus LJ 295.
18. Ibid at 301.
19. Ibid at 304-306.
20. Must those guiding values be moral? Or is it possible for theory-construction to be guided only
by “epistemic” values such as simplicity or charity? Both involve “normative” considerations. For
further discussion, see Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism
and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially chapters 1,
6.
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law.” Or even by treating “employment law” as a “subset” of “labour law.”
That would retrieve employment law from relative obscurity by locating it
within the scholarly perimeter, and this would counter the tendency toward
“overly compartmentalized thinking” that Langille rightly criticizes.21 In
short, pedagogic values are agnostic on whether we should treat labour law
as a “subset” of “employment law” or vice versa. They simply advocate
taking employment law seriously as a body of norms, without specifying
how it should be related structurally to labour law.
Nor have these pedagogic considerations remained stable over time.
In 2020, we are now facing the opposite of the pedagogic problems that
Langille was grappling with in 1981. In an era of dwindling trade union
membership and collective bargaining in precipitous decline, it is now
the collective side of the discipline that faces the existential threat to its
viability as an area of scholarly enquiry. For example, Cynthia Estlund has
observed that “the health and vitality of labor law, both as a body of law
and as a field of scholarly enquiry, hinges on the vitality of the institutions
that define labor law: labor unions and collective bargaining. Therein lies
the problem.”22 Nor is the threat of intellectual extinction confined to US
scholarship, with the Australian labour lawyer Richard Mitchell asking
in a similar vein, “Does one continue to focus on the details of collective
bargaining, trade unions, strike law and so on when these do no not reflect
the reality of how labour markets are operating?”23 In leading textbooks in
the UK, it is now common for chapters on collective topics to be published
“online” and separately from the printed text covering more familiar topics
such as the contract of employment, employment status, and dismissal.
This would have been unthinkable a generation ago. There is also a dearth
of up-to-date specialist textbooks on collective labour law. In this way,
the problem of intellectual marginalization has flipped in the decades that
followed the publication of “Subset.” Labour law is now the endangered
species in the legal academy. Few students may have ever encountered a
trade union or a collective agreement, and fewer judges handling labour
cases in the appellate courts have a deep understanding of the distinctive
logic of collective action. By treating (collective) labour law as a “subset”
at the margins, are we being complicit in its demise? And why should we
care?

21. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
22. Estlund, “The Death of Labour Law,” supra note 14 at 105.
23. Richard Mitchell, “Where are We Going in Labour Law? Some Thoughts on a Field of
Scholarship and policy in process of change” (2011) 24 Austl J Lab L 45 at 59.
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One answer is provided by John Gardner, who has recently praised
the “precarious equilibrium” that existed between “labour law” and
“employment law” in the early post-war period, particularly as represented
in the work of Otto Kahn-Freund.24 According to Gardner, “the shift marked
by the re-branding of ‘labour law’ as ‘employment law’” may symbolize
a process of tragic proportions, whereby work has been so degraded
through its hyper-contractualization that it is no longer capable of being
an integral part of a flourishing life.25 Nomenclature and the disciplinary
organization of legal norms matter because they reflexively shape how we
view work, how we demarcate it from non-work, and how we regulate it
through law. This indicates a role for “beneficial moral consequences” as
a criterion for determining how to organize legal norms into a coherent
grouping.26 It has already been suggested that there are a range of ways
in which the legal norms regulating work might be organized into a
coherent set. The “beneficial moral consequences” thesis would direct us
to favour models that have beneficial moral consequences. For example,
by choosing a disciplinary model that continues to emphasize collective
norms despite the fact that trade union membership is in decline, this could
give the value of solidarity appropriate recognition in public discourse
about work. This value might otherwise be marginalized or eclipsed. Or by
formulating the discipline around the “law of work” rather than the “law of
employment” this might lead judges and legislators to treat non-standard
work arrangements as more readily within the scope of protective statutes.
A world in which solidarity is taken more seriously, or a world in which
more workers are protected from exploitation, is a better world. To the
extent that some models of legal reality can lead to better moral outcomes,
we have a normative reason for preferring those models.
By now, we have left the pedagogic arguments long behind. Without
the support of normative arguments, such as the “beneficial moral
consequences” thesis, pedagogic arguments provide only weak support
for the “subset” approach. Indeed, Langille himself pursues more
normative arguments in his own work, and it is here that we find the main
intellectual justification for his “subset” approach. According to Langille,
employment law must be understood as based upon a moral foundation. As

24. John Gardner, “The Contractualization of Labour Law” in Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester, &
Virginia Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018) 33.
25. Ibid at 34.
26. For an outline and critique of the “beneficial moral consequences” methodological thesis, see
Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2001).
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he later argued, employment law depends upon a “theory of justice.”27 In
“Subset,” this theory of justice was closely based upon Ronald Dworkin’s
account of liberal equality in Taking Rights Seriously, a book that had
been published only a few years before in 1977.28 Building on Dworkin’s
theory, Langille argues that citizens have a right to equal concern and
respect. This requires that “modern democratic states…provide and
protect the liberties of its citizens while at the same time providing a
minimum set of social conditions.”29 Given the importance of employment
to the identity, worth and self-esteem of citizens, employment law is a
fundamental legal mechanism for securing liberal equality for citizens.
“Respect” norms ensure that citizens enjoy the capacity to formulate and
pursue a conception of the good; this would include the protection of
basic rights and liberties in the workplace. “Concern” norms ensure that
citizens are provided with a social and economic minimum enabling them
to live a dignified life, such as a decent wage and decent working time. For
Langille, this right to equal concern and respect positions “employment
law” as the set and “labour law” as the “subset.” On his argument, this
also means that “public values” have priority over “private values” in the
regulation of employment.
This claim that “public values” have priority over “private values”
raises many questions. How do we distinguish public and private values?
Are there multiple values in both domains? Is it the case that any public
value has decisive weight whenever it runs up against any private value?
Do we identify values as “public” whenever they are implemented in a
statute or might statutes sometimes implement “private” values too?
Langille argues that the prioritization of “public values” supports the
rejection of “freedom of contract” for individuals in an employment
relationship. This is because “inequality of bargaining power” means that
individual employment contracts rarely secure “concern” and “respect”
for employees in the workplace. “Public values” also impose limits on
the “autonomy” of voluntary collective bargaining. This is because public
policies expressed in employment statutes should (sometimes) override
“free” collective bargaining.
Here we arrive at the real crux of the “Subset” thesis. Imagine a
collective agreement implements a pay structure that is racially or sexually
discriminatory. Such an agreement would fail to secure a minimum level
27. Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, The
Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 104.
28. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
1997).
29. Langille, supra note 1 at 201.
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of “respect” for employees. The right to equal concern and respect would
justify the vindication of the public values of the liberal community as
reflected in human rights or anti-discrimination legislation.30 The public
values, as expressed in this legislation, should override the discriminatory
terms in the collective agreement. Or the collective agreement deviates
from the minimum level of “concern” as enacted in the statutory floor of
rights by specifying a level of pay below the statutory minimum. Liberal
equality demands that the contracting out of statutory protections should
be restricted.31 At the very least, Langille argues that employees covered
by collective agreements should not be exempted from the coverage of
statutory minimum entitlements.32 He also argues that arbitrators should
consider the effects of employment statutes in the interpretation and
enforcement of collective agreements.33 Since the minimum threshold of
concern and respect was set by the “floor of rights,” collective bargaining
should not depart from that threshold. This is why labour law is the subset,
and employment law the set.34 Employment law sets the basic minimum
of a dignified working life for all employees, and labour law provides
procedural structures that empower employees to bargain collectively and
secure advantages beyond the statutory floor.
Are these concerns still relevant? The problem of integrating
employment statutes into the private arbitration of collective agreements
seems a rather quaint distraction from the rise of Gig work, algorithmic
management, the displacement of human work by robots, the collapse of
collective bargaining in the private sector, and a growing “precariat.” In
an era where collective bargaining is dwindling to vanishing point in the
private sector, and neoliberal governments are dismantling the statutory
floor of rights, do the problems animating “Subset” in 1981 still resonate?
There are two aspects of “Subset” that speak powerfully to our
current challenges. The first aspect is Langille’s identification of certain
fundamental non-derogable entitlements for individuals, such as a right
to refuse work in situations of risk to health and safety. Such “refusal of
work” provisions have become important in the context of COVID-19
and the hasty implementation of “return to work” policies of national

30. Ibid at 214-215.
31. Ibid at 215-217.
32. Ibid at 217.
33. Ibid at 221-226.
34. The limits of the “autonomy” of collective bargaining, and the extent to which pluralist bargaining
should be restricted in favour of the common good, was an acute concern in debates around collective
laissez-faire in the 1960s and 1970s. See, further, Alan Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union
Recognition (Oxford: Hart, 2009), chapter 2.
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governments. As collective structures and institutions have degraded over
time, might there be other fundamental individual entitlements? And could
such entitlements provide opportunities for collective renewal? If so, could
these fundamental entitlements constitute an (individual) “employment
law” foundation for a revitalized (collective) “labour law?”
The second aspect is in Langille’s emphasis on public enforcement,
effective remedies, and institutional structures in employment law. The
involvement of public agencies in supporting the enforcement of individual
rights disrupts conventional understandings of the “private” and “public”
in employment law. In both Canadian and UK law, the issue of effective
enforcement is now at the top of the scholarly and public policy agenda.
The crisis of enforcement has played out differently across jurisdictions. In
North America, the focus has been on the use of private arbitration clauses
to circumvent public adjudication in public courts. In the UK, concern
has centred on economic impediments to claimants’ access to courts, for
example through the imposition of excessive court fees. There has also
been a renewed interest in enforcement through public agencies, with
individual remedies often ill-suited to tackling systemic problems such as
“wage theft” and under-payment of national minimum wage entitlements.
Let us examine each aspect in turn.
II. The “Individual” and “Collective” in employment law: Employment
law as a basic foundation of labour law
In “Subset,” Langille discusses the Canada Labour Code provision that
provides that an individual employee has a right to refuse work where
there is reasonable cause to believe that: “(a) the use or operation of a
machine, device or thing would constitute an imminent danger to the
safety or health of himself or another employee, or (b) a condition exists
in any place that would constitute an imminent danger to his own safety
or health.”35 This “right to refuse” is operative until a safety officer has
determined that there is no “imminent danger.” The employee cannot be
disciplined by the employer for exercising the “right to refuse,” and the
Canada Labour Relations Board has the power to reinstate an employee
who is dismissed for exercising the right.36
The fundamental nature of this right is reflected in its enforcement
regime. It is separated from the general provisions on grievance arbitration.
Consequently, a trade union cannot waive the right on the employee’s

35. Langille, supra note 1 at 209, referring to the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, s 82. 1 (1)
(now s 128).
36. Langille, supra note 1 at 209.
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behalf.37 This means that “this very basic right” cannot be “lost in the
shuffle of the duty of fair representation.”38 In the terminology of modern
private law theory, the primary right (to refuse work) is supported by a
legal power vested in the primary right-holder (the refusing employee)
to pursue a remedy in a public forum. Her legal power to seek redress
cannot be overridden by an intervening third party, such as a trade union.
Interestingly, this “right to refuse work” is also specified in the recent
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 190 concerning the
Elimination of Violence and Harassment in the World of Work.39 Article
10 (g) provides that “workers have the right to remove themselves from a
work situation which they have reasonable justification to believe presents
an imminent and serious danger to life, health or safety due to violence and
harassment, without suffering retaliation or other undue consequences.”40
Langille argues that the “right to refuse” provides security of
employment to an employee who acts upon what is perhaps one of the
most fundamental of all an employee’s concerns—his or her own health
and safety as well as that of others. This is one of the most fundamental
rights in employment law, connected to the basic right to life and bodily
integrity. Should the labour code’s “right to refuse” be understood as a
“job security” right? Or as an “occupational health and safety” right?
Let me make another suggestion. The true significance of the “right to
refuse” is that it can be understood as a protean right to strike, with strong
individual protections against employer retaliation. Are there imminent
risks to other fundamental interests that would justify an extension of this
“right to refuse?” The ILO Convention on violence and harassment at work
suggests a broad conceptualization of health and safety. Should the “right
to refuse” extend to other “basic liberties” such as non-discrimination
or freedom of expression in the workplace?41 And where individual
employees are engaged in a “basic liberties” strike of this kind, should this
be treated as a non-waivable core that is not subject to collectively agreed
peace obligations?42 Beyond the “right to strike,” we can enquire more
generally into the scope for individual rights to provide the basic building
37. Ibid at 229.
38. Ibid.
39. International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No 190);
International Labour Organization, Violence and Harassment Recommendation, 2019 (No 206).
40. Ibid.
41. For a discussion and defense of a “basic liberties strike” based in a republican theory of nondomination, see Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, “The Right to Strike and Contestatory Citizenship” in
Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 229.
42. Ibid at 247-249.

494 The Dalhousie Law Journal

blocks for “collective” rights such as the right to collective bargaining.43
“Labour law is a subset of employment law” is a formula that highlights
how individual entitlements provide building blocks for collective norms
and institutions. In an era of persistent decline for collective bargaining,
and with it the atrophy of “labour law” itself, the role of individual
entitlements in supporting collective action in new forms of precarious
work is of fundamental practical importance.
At the most basic level some individual employment rights, such as
general protection from unjust dismissal, support a culture of contestation
in the workplace so that individual employees will feel less inhibited
in their expressive activities.44 This culture of contestation may lead
to more developed forms of collective organization. Even within the
collective domain of labour law, individual rights such as the right not to
be victimized for trade union membership or activities provide a crucial
underpinning to the collective “right to organize.”45 Elements of the
“individual” and “collective” are blended differently in different labour
law systems. The most basic enquiry is the identity of the right-holder: is
it an individual right for employees, a group right vested in the trade union
itself, or a composite right for individuals and their trade unions? Once
the primary right has been allocated, we must then decide whether legal
rules should give standing to third parties, such as trade unions or public
officials, to enforce individual rights on behalf of the right-holder. In
certain circumstances, the third party might even enjoy a normative power
to waive those primary rights. Where there are wide standing rules, giving
normative powers to trade unions or public officials to enforce the primary
right on the individual’s behalf, this gives a strong public dimension to
the enforcement of rights. Careful attention to these different axes in the
architecture of rights highlights the rich variety of models in the “right to
organize” in different legal systems. A brief examination of the UK, the
US and Canada demonstrates this variety.
The UK model is strongly individualistic. Its freedom of association
rights are “bipolar” in form, and they resemble the basic structure of a
private law right.46 This is because the right contemplates a single relation
between an individual right-holder (the employee or worker) and an
43. On the notion of individual rights as “building blocks” for a collective right to organize, see Lord
Wedderburn, “Employment Protection Act 1975: Collective Aspects” (1976) 39:2 Mod L Rev 169.
44. Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, “Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest: Getting Back
to Basics” in Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz, eds, Voices at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
141.
45. Supra note 43.
46. Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 4.
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individual wrongdoer (the employer), and the remedy aims to restore the
position of the right-holder by repairing the wrong. This is marked by
private law-style “correlativity,” namely that “the liability of the defendant
is always a liability to the plaintiff. Liability consists in a legal relationship
between two parties each of whose position is intelligible only in light
of the other’s.”47 The UK statute posits rights for individual workers and
employees not to be subjected to a detriment, dismissed or to have offers
made to them on a range of protected grounds including trade union
membership, participation in trade union activities at an appropriate time,
and use of union services. This legal structure is highly individualistic.
The right-holder is an individual worker or employee.48 The trade union
is not a separate right-holder with legally protected interests. It can only
benefit derivatively from the enforcement of individual rights. Secondly,
the trade union does not have standing to enforce the individual’s statutory
right not to be victimized. Nor is there a public agency that assists in the
enforcement of these fundamental rights. The claim must be brought by
the individual worker or employee, and she has the exclusive normative
power to determine whether to pursue it. The UK legal structure is highly
convergent with a private law model.
By contrast, the US model is based upon an “unfair labor practice”
regime, the broad structure of which was introduced in sections 7 and
8 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Section 7 specifies the
fundamental associative rights of employees in the following terms:
“employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”49

These fundamental associative rights are protected by a set of “unfair
labor practices” set out in section 8. These provisions are administered by
an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
which adjudicates “unfair labor practice” complaints and determines the
remedies for violations under section 8.
The right-holder under this labour relations regime is the individual
employee. The legal procedure is initiated by the filing of an “unfair labor
practice” charge, and this charge may be filed by “any person, even a
47. Ibid at 18.
48. “Workers” are protected from “detriment” and “offers” under the Trade Union and Labour
Relations Consolidation Act (TULRCA) 1992, ss 145A, 145B and 146. “Employees” are protected
from refusal of access to employment and dismissal under TULRCA 1992, ss 137 and 152.
49. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA § 7 (1935).
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stranger to the dispute” and so “need not be filed by the person actually
aggrieved or adversely affected by the alleged misconduct.”50 As such, the
standing rules for enforcement of “unfair labor practices” are very wide.
In this respect, it departs from the tight private law structure of the UK
right to organize, based on correlativity between claimant and defendant.
It is for the regional directors of the Board, acting under the authority
of the General Counsel, to determine whether an “unfair labor practice”
complaint should be issued against the party alleged to have breached
the legal provisions. At this stage, the General Counsel “has plenary
authority to determine whether an unfair labor practice complaint should
be issued.”51 If the complaint is issued, the prosecutorial wing of the Board
(consisting of lawyers for the General Counsel) will represent the charging
party in proceedings before a separate adjudicative wing of the Board,
although a charging party may also participate in those proceedings and be
represented by its own lawyers.52
This approach reflects the distinctive historical origins of the US
statutory structure, where the Wagner Act was “enacted in an era of
swelling confidence in the administrative state” hence “it contains no
private right of action.”53 The decision to avoid private law enforcement
perhaps also reflected ambivalence on the part of workers and trade
unions about judicial involvement in the adjudication of labour relations
disputes.54 According to Godard, 31 per cent of filings were made by
individuals, compared with 69 percent by trade unions.55 In this way, the
enforcement of freedom of association rights under US law is both highly
statist (reflected in the General Counsel’s pivotal role) and, in practice,
highly collectivist (reflected in the de facto enforcement role of trade
unions in “unfair labor practice” proceedings).
In Canada, there is a wider variation in legal structure, reflecting the
fact that labour relations are regulated at the provincial as well as the
federal level. The Ontario model of “unfair labour practices” provides
a typical example of the Canadian statutory model. Section 70 of the
Ontario Labour Relations Act 1995 provides that “[n]o employer or
50. Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective
Bargaining, 2nd ed (St Paul MN: West Publishing, 2004) at 10.
51. William B Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law, 4th ed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004)
at 60.
52. Ibid at 61.
53. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 39 [Regoverning the Workplace].
54. Ibid.
55. John Godard, Trade Union Recognition: Statutory Unfair Labour Practice Regimes in the USA
and Canada (London: Department for Trade and Industry, 2004) at 18.
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employers’ organization and no person acting on behalf of an employer
or an employers’ organization shall participate in or interfere with the
formation, selection or administration of a trade union or the representation
of employees by a trade union or contribute financial or other support to
a trade union.”56 This has been interpreted as positing an “institutional”
right for trade unions, rather than any “personal” right of an individual
employee.57 Section 72, by contrast, is concerned with the protection of
employees’ rights. It provides inter alia that no employer “shall refuse to
employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person
in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because
the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercising any
other rights under this Act.” This envisages a complementary structure of
individual and collective rights, recognizing the artificiality of severing
those elements in many disputes involving trade union victimization.58
Individuals do not have standing to enforce the section 70 unfair labour
practice provision. Since this is an “institutional” right of trade unions,
enforcement of that right is confined to trade unions rather than individual
employees. While employees have standing to enforce their own rights
under section 72, the trade union also has standing to pursue complaints
on behalf of affected employees. In situations of anti-union victimization
against individual employees, in practice the trade union will usually seek
enforcement of “institutional” rights under section 70 and “personal”
rights under section 72. In this way, the Ontario legislation operates rules
of standing that are both collective and individual. While individuals have
no standing to enforce “institutional” rights, the legislation recognizes
the vital role of trade unions performing an enforcement role on behalf
of affected employees. This offers a pragmatic response to the practical
difficulties of individuals being required to enforce their own “personal”
rights in situations where the employer is hostile towards unionization.
This brief overview indicates the complexity of the individualcollective distinction. For example, the well-documented failings of the US
system are significantly attributable to the weak individual remedies and
legal enforcement regime where employees are dismissed with impunity.
In this vein, Cynthia Estlund has posed the following question of US law:
“What if labor law had kept up with the times and added a private right of
action for anti-union discrimination that the law already condemns? We
might have had a ‘common law’ of anti-union discrimination, with cross56.
57.
58.

Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A.
James Mically Clock #2216 v Board of Governors, [1991] OLRB Rep 734.
Canadian Paperworkers Union (CPU) v International Wallcoverings, [1983] OLRB Rep 1316.
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fertilization from other wrongful discharge doctrines.”59 On this approach,
a strongly enforced private right of action for anti-union discrimination,
with effective remedies for victimized individuals, should be viewed as
integral to a well-functioning labour relations regime. This provides a
strong example of how employment law could be a precondition of an
effective system of labour law. This is not inconsistent with also recognizing
a strong public dimension to the enforcement of private rights of action.
This could consist in giving trade unions or public agencies opportunities
to provide material support to the individual right-holder or even to pursue
the rights-violation on her behalf.60 It is a strength of the Canadian model
that it blends the individual and the collective in some of its labour codes.
We also begin to see the complexity of “public” and “private” in
different legal approaches to the “personal scope” of labour rights. One
of the fundamental contemporary issues in freedom of association is the
exclusion of certain forms of personal work relations, sectors or occupations
from the scope of legal protection. In English law, legal responses to
unjustified exclusion focused predominantly on the refinement of private
law tests as a basis for characterizing the “true agreement” between the
parties.61 The gateway into legal protection in UK law is that X works as
an “employee” or a “worker” under a contract with the employer. This has
caused difficulties in situations where the employer uses comprehensive
written documentation to present the working arrangements as selfemployment, which may be incompatible with employee or worker status
necessary to qualify for legal protection. The English courts have deployed
a “purposive” sham doctrine, which has allowed them to disregard written
terms where these are inconsistent with the “true agreement” between the
parties.62 Although the sham doctrine can be unpredictable in difficult cases,
it marks the emergence of a worker-protective private law approach that
is properly located within employment law, and upon which (collective)
labour law protections depend.63 In Canada, by contrast, legal challenges
to the formal exclusion of certain categories such as agricultural workers
have been pursued through constitutional litigation using the Canadian
59. Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace, supra note 53 at 40.
60. It does not follow that a trade union or public agency should enjoy an unfettered normative
power to waive or extinguish an individual claim against the wishes of that individual.
61. See eg Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher, [2011] UKSC 41.
62. Ibid.
63. It should be noted that “employment status” cases in the UK are now being influenced by
equality-type arguments, building upon fundamental rights jurisprudence under the European
Convention on Human Rights and Article 14. For a recent example, see Gilham v Ministry of Justice
(Protect intervening), [2019] UKSC 44, which extended whistleblowing protections to District Judges
using equality arguments.
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Charter’s protection of general freedom of association.64 Both “private”
(in the UK) and “public” (in Canada) legal strategies have enjoyed
some moderate success in securing inclusion for excluded workers. The
choice of legal strategy reflects the constitutional differences between
these two countries, and the extent to which fundamental labour rights
are constitutionally protected (as in Canada) or are matters of statutory
interpretation (as in the UK).
In sum, the arguments in “Subset” emphasize an important dimension
of collective action that may have been underappreciated at the time the
piece was written. This is the indispensability of basic individual rights
as a foundation for more developed collective structures and institutions.
Or, to use Langille’s terminology, employment law is the “set” and labour
law the “subset.” This basic substrate has grown in significance as new
forms of work, such as “gig work,” have propagated. This has exposed
the important intersection between employment law and labour law,
particularly in the fundamental issue of the identity of the work contract
and the exclusion of certain groups (ie the self-employed or agricultural
workers) from the scope of collective bargaining statutes.
These issues also highlight a difficulty with Langille’s general claim
that “public” values should have priority over “private” values. This brief
discussion reveals the difficulty, which is that the “public” and “private”
interact in myriad complex ways. Kit Barker has emphasized that there
are “many (not one) private/public distinctions at stake.”65 It is important
to be sensitive to these distinctions when the concepts are being invoked.
We should be skeptical about assigning a global normative priority to
the “public,” without understanding the sense in which “public” is being
used, and how it is being contrasted with “private.” In developing his
framework, Barker refers to a helpful typology set out in the work of
Michaels and Jansen.66 Drawing upon this framework, a key argument in
“Subset,” what might be described as the “primacy of employment law,”
does not straightforwardly correspond to the “primacy of public values.”
Employment law is “private” in the sense that it often allocates rights
to individual right-holders, and the infringement of those rights by the
employer duty-bearer is treated as a matter of corrective justice. It is also
“private” in that it does not generally regulate relations between the citizen
and the state, but citizens in their private capacities. Many of the doctrines
64. See, eg, Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20.
65. Barker, supra note 8 at 20.
66. Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization,
Privatization” (2006) 54:4 Am J Comp L 843, discussed in Barker, supra note 8 at 20-21.
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being developed, such as the English “sham” doctrine or the recent use of
unconscionability in the employment context in Canada,67 have their roots
in private law doctrines and categories.
Employment law also has important “public” aspects. Many individual
employment rights are justified in part by their contribution to public
goods, as well as the interest of the individual right-holder. For example,
the right to a decent wage could be understood as being justified in part
by its contribution to a public good, the maintenance of a public culture of
decent work. Employment law is also “public” in the sense that the rights
are usually implemented through statute, administered by special tribunals
rather than ordinary courts, with those rights sometimes enforced at the
initiative of public officials. Also, as private law doctrines are developed
and applied in their encounter with statutory employment rights, there is a
“constitutionalization” of private law as issues such as employment status
determination are infused with public constitutional values. To understand
employment law, and its relationship with labour law, we would do
better to keep both the private and public dimensions in view, rather than
assigning blanket priority to one or the other.
III. The public and private in employment law: Enforcement
architectures
The second dimension of “Subset” focuses on legal procedures, and
modes of enforcement and adjudication. Langille observes that “the most
overlooked aspect of the effort to bring a minimum of concern and respect
to the employment relationship is the substantial institutional structure and
powerful enforcement mechanisms established under the various pieces of
legislation.”68 This structure provides for powerful public support for the
enforcement of employment rights. In Nova Scotia, for example, Langille
set out the main features of that legislation, which
“compels employers to keep records, gives broad powers to public
officials to investigate and attempt to settle complaints (or on their own
motion) and to make binding orders, subject to the right of the employer
to appeal to a higher tribunal. If the employer does contest the order the
employee is represented by a public official.”69

In this way, the enforcement mechanisms of employment law reveal an
interesting hybridity of private law and public law. Protective employment
statutes allocate primary rights to employees, and infringements of those
67. Heller v Uber Technologies Inc, 2019 ONCA 1 [Heller]. And see now Uber Technologies Inc v
Heller, 2020 SCC 16.
68. Langille, supra note 1 at 211.
69. Ibid.

“Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” Revisited

501

primary rights generate reparative obligations on the employer duty-bearer,
enforceable through a public institution such as a court or tribunal. Unlike
ordinary private law rights, however, public officials also have a central
role in enforcing employment rights. They might initiate investigations
of breaches, pursue enforcement actions against recalcitrant employers,
and even provide representation to the employee where the employer
contests the binding order made against it. It is common to see labour
inspectorates charged with the public task of promoting compliance with
labour standards. It would be more surprising to see “torts inspectorates”
charged with the public responsibility to promote compliance with the
private rights protected through the law of torts. Therein lies a most
interesting puzzle.
Langille also provides important reflections on the role of arbitration
and the “duty of fair representation” in Canadian labour law. Langille is
broadly supportive of the central role of arbitration in the interpretation and
enforcement of collective agreements. He also supports the proposition
that arbitrators should integrate relevant statutory material into the
interpretation of collective agreements. This would seem to follow from
his commitment to vindicating public values against private interests.
Here, the public values are represented in general legislation, and private
values are represented by the autonomy of the collective bargaining parties
to pursue their own interests in a private contractual process.
The overlap between statutory standards and collectively agreed norms
is particularly problematic where the labour code defers to the remedies
provided in the collective agreement. This is because the employee may be
deprived of the normative power to pursue the grievance. The trade union
may elect not to pursue the employee’s grievance, though this election is
subject to a “duty of fair representation.” In this situation, Langille asks
several questions:
If it is impossible to contract out of these acts, how is it possible to deny
the employee the right to pursue his remedy by the side wind of the
application of the duty of fair representation? Is it possible for a trade
union not to pursue a statutory right and yet not be in breach of that
duty? Can the statutory right be traded or balanced off, as we recognize
individual claims to collective agreement rights properly may be?70

Langille argues persuasively that the union’s duty of fair representation
should be shaped by statutory policies in the relevant legislation. This
would mean that where fundamental rights were protected through statute,
70.

Ibid at 227.
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such as equal pay or the right to refuse work in the face of imminent
danger, the employee (rather than a third party such as a trade union)
should possess the normative power to seek redress through adjudication.
This reveals the shifting nature of public and private values. For the
repositioning of the normative power so that it rests with the primary rightholder, the employee herself, is strongly characteristic of the architecture
of private law and the values of corrective justice.
Enforcement is now one of the most difficult and controversial areas
in contemporary labour law. We will consider two such examples drawn
from UK and Canadian law. The first example is the growing significance
of arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts. These clauses
provide a mechanism for contracting out of public courts, channeling
disputes about public statutory rights into private arbitration. In more
extreme forms, they also provide a substitute for capital mobility so
that transnational firms can escape the regulatory requirements within
particular jurisdictions through “choice of law” clauses determining the
applicable law. We might describe this as the phenomenon of juridical
mobility, which is more frictionless than capital mobility. The second
example is the political attack on substantive labour rights through the
tightening of procedural law. This enables a de facto deregulation of
employment rights, while the substantive law on the statute books remains
untouched. An example of this is provided by the UK’s recent experience
with tribunal fees for claimants, the effect of which was to decimate the
individual enforcement of employment law in the UK.
Enforcement identifies a fundamental way in which the private and
public are inseparably linked: “Public institutions such as courts are
required for private rights to be determined, declared and coercively
enforced as a system. The basic function of these institutions is, nonetheless,
to systematize and make those rights omnilateral.”71 This linkage between
private rights and public adjudication has been a central topic in some
recent work in private law theory. Here I focus on the work of Arthur
Ripstein72 and John Gardner,73 and their reflections on the role of public
courts in private law.
In Private Wrongs, Ripstein explains the role of public courts in
the light of his basic commitment to private rights as a scheme of equal
freedom. The plaintiff enjoys an unfettered normative power to decide
whether to seek redress in court in situations where a wrong has been
71.
72.
73.

Barker, supra note 8 at 13.
Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
John Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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perpetrated against her. Why does the state take no stand on whether her
rights should be vindicated and corrective justice restored? After all, a
world in which fewer private wrongs are committed would be a better
world, would it not? The answer, for Ripstein, lies in a feature of private
rights in general. The wronged party’s power to see reparation in a court
of law is a corollary of the position that “the state takes no position on
whether you should exercise your power.”74 As with the exercise of
primary rights, so it is with the power to vindicate those rights if they are
infringed. The state stands ready to protect those rights if called upon to do
so, but enforcement must be at the plaintiff’s initiative. The injured party is
left free “to decide whether to stand” on her infringed rights.75 She might
decide to accept an apology. Or she might decide that litigation isn’t worth
the hassle. Or she might agree through contract to submit to a cheap and
expeditious form of private dispute resolution, such as private arbitration.
All of this is left to the plaintiff to decide. To return to our earlier example,
that is why there is no “torts inspectorate” to encourage victims to seek
legal redress against tortfeasors.
Ripstein also explains how a scheme of private rights is dependent
upon a system of public courts. The plaintiff and defendant are each
in charge of themselves. Where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
wronged by the defendant, that remains an allegation “until a third party
with authority over both the plaintiff and the defendant has resolved the
dispute on its merits.”76 This means that the state has an “obligation and
entitlement to set up institutions for making, applying, and enforcing
law.”77 Not only do courts provide an authoritative resolution of the
dispute between plaintiff and defendant. They also provide authoritative
determinations of the relevant law, the provision of which is a public good
for all citizens.78 In this way, a comprehensive system of private arbitration
could not provide a satisfactory substitute for a system of authoritative
public courts. Ripstein also recognizes that there may sometimes be good
reasons to replace private rights with alternative mechanisms of public
protection (for example, workplace safety insurance).79 Nevertheless,
where X’s entitlement is a private right, the ability for an individual
plaintiff to opt into private arbitration is a corollary of Ripstein’s general
approach to private rights and normative powers. Furthermore, where X’s
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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entitlement is a private right, it would be wrong to give a third party any
power over the enforcement of that entitlement.
In From Personal Life to Private Law, John Gardner recognizes
the “radically discretionary” character of the plaintiff’s power to decide
whether to pursue the defendant through law.80 Indeed, Gardner regards
this aspect of private law as something of a puzzle. The plaintiff can decide
to sue the defendant on the most spurious of grounds. If she decides to
do so, she can bring the awesome machinery of the state to bear on the
defendant, through the medium of public courts. Gardner rejects the idea
that this feature can be explained and justified through an appeal to personal
freedom. Indeed, he characterizes it as “a typically illiberal arrangement”
for “however stupid, she can dignify her stupidity with the authority of the
court and foist it thereby on the defendant” in legal proceedings.81 Can this
special position of the plaintiff, the legal system’s chosen “enforcer” of
her own primary rights, be justified other than through the plaintiff’s own
freedom?
According to Gardner, the “tertiary right” of a plaintiff against others
“that they not usurp her in asserting or enforcing” her primary right (and
secondary right to reparation following its infringement) is structurally
very different to her primary and secondary rights.82 That is because the
duties corresponding to the tertiary right are not, like the primary and
secondary rights, duties imposed on the defendant. These “tertiary duties”
are duties on the rest of us either to not obstruct or even to positively
support the plaintiff in vindicating her own rights against the defendant.
According to Gardner, the special role of the plaintiff as an “enforcer” of
her own rights in the legal system is justified on the basis of a range of
public good arguments: (i) the coercive character of the public judicial
system incentivizes defendants to engage with claims of wrongdoing, and
this could promote alternative (cheaper, less stressful) processes for the
defendant to repair the wrong against the plaintiff; (ii) prosecuting officials
“may be more expensive, more erratic, less nimble, and/or less sensitive
to the niceties of the situation than the plaintiff…Sometimes (eg when
intimidation of the plaintiff is likely) the pursuit of a wrongdoer by a
prosecutor may serve the person wronged, as well as the rest of us, better”;
(iii) third-party intervention might exacerbate the dispute, although in
certain situations skilled intervention could defuse the situation; (iv) the
distribution of enforcement powers to private individuals militates against
80.
81.
82.

Gardner, supra note 73 at 201.
Ibid at 202.
Ibid at 207.
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concentrations of power in public officials, and this “contributes to the
flourishing of the rule of law by ensuring that the law and its institutions
do not become a tool only of an oligarchy of officials.”83 We should note
the public and instrumental character of these considerations, all of which
go to support an ostensibly “private” power of the plaintiff to seek legal
redress.
These engagements from Ripstein and Gardner offer important
perspectives on some themes from “Subset.” Take, for instance, the idea
that third parties such as trade unions might have standing to enforce (or
perhaps even waive) enforcement of the employee’s rights. The idea of third
party standing to enforce private rights would be scarcely comprehensible
on Ripstein’s account. By contrast, there is more space in Gardner’s
account to accommodate such an arrangement. The involvement of a thirdparty enforcer might incentivize employers to engage with the allegation
of wrongdoing without the expense of litigation. Trade union officials
are less likely to be intimidated by employers, and the special expertise
of trade unions in dispute resolution mean that there are advantages in
giving them standing rights. A role for trade union enforcers serves the
rule of law by diffusing undue concentrations of power, particularly in
public enforcement agencies. There is fertile scope for experimentation
with hybrid enforcement models coordinated between public and private
actors. For example, where enforcement strategies opt for a “prosecution
model” over a “litigation model,”84 we might prefer to disperse power
by giving trade unions and employees opportunities to pursue private
prosecutions or to seek judicial review of an enforcement agency’s
decision not to prosecute. We might also prefer enforcement models that
adopt a “prosecution model” alongside a “litigation model,” rather than to
treat the “prosecution model” as a substitute, so that individuals do not feel
disempowered in the enforcement process.85 This provides an extra reason
to be wary of elevating the “public” over the “private” at a methodological
level, not least because it risks obscuring the vital contribution of recent
work in private law theory to advancing our understanding of enforcement
issues in employment law.
We will examine two recent examples that illustrate this complex
interplay between “public” and “private” in enforcement: the use of
83. Ibid at 210.
84. Ibid at 209.
85. In this respect, the UK law on health and safety opted for a “prosecution model” and extinguished
the ability of individuals to seek civil reparation, with deregulatory effects. See Michael Ford, “The
Criminalization of Health and Safety at Work” in Alan Bogg, Jennifer Collins, Mark Freedland &
Jonathan Herring, eds, Criminality at Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) 409.
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arbitration clauses in employment contracts and the approach of the
Canadian courts in Uber v Heller,86 and the regime of tribunal fees in the
UK, which was struck down as unlawful by the UK Supreme Court.87
Heller involved a legal challenge to a mandatory arbitration clause
in a contract between Uber and an UberEATS driver, and whether there
needed to be a mandatory stay of court proceedings under the Arbitration
Act 1991 given the existence of the arbitration clause. The arbitration
clause required disputes to be referred to arbitration in Amsterdam, which
would be subject to the law of the Netherlands. The clause also required
the payment of US $14,500 as an administrative cost. The appellant earned
$20,800–$31,200 per year before taxes and expenses were deducted. Nor
did the fee include other costs likely to be incurred in an arbitration, such
as travel to Amsterdam, accommodation, and legal representation. The
Ontario Court of Appeal determined that the arbitration clause was invalid
for two reasons. First, it constituted an unlawful “contracting out” of the
protective provisions of the Employment Standards Act 2000. Second, the
arbitration clause was invalid based on the unconscionability doctrine’s
necessary conditions:
1. a grossly unfair and improvident transaction;
2. a victim’s lack of independent legal advice or other suitable advice;
3. an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the
victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language
of the bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar
disability; and
4. the other party’s knowingly taking advantage of this vulnerability.88

The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Heller represented a powerful
countermovement against the use of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. These arbitration clauses have sought to exploit the differences
in worker-protection between different labour law systems. Legal norms
are configured as an object of consumer choice, like shoes or sofas. In
the most extreme versions, employment contracts may provide for
compulsory and individualized private arbitration so that employment
disputes are channeled out of the system of public courts entirely.89 In the
US, the public courts have themselves been complicit in this privatization
86. Heller, supra note 67.
87. R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 WLR 409 [UNISON]; Michael Ford,
“Employment Tribunal Fees and the Rule of Law: R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor in the Supreme
Court” (2018) 47: 1 Indus LJ 1.
88. Heller, supra note 67 at para 60.
89. Matthew W Finkin, American Labor And The Law: Dormant, Resurgent, And Emergent
Problems (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International BV, 2019) at 54-62.
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of public justice.90 The unconscionability argument in Heller can be
understood as a private law response to the problem of arbitration, focusing
on the exploitative contracting behaviour of powerful corporate actors
such as Uber. This bargaining context (the gross substantive unfairness
of the contractual term, the extreme imbalance of bargaining power, the
absence of legal advice, knowingly taking advantage of the weaker party’s
contractual vulnerability) meant that the contract term was invalid.
By contrast, the statutory “contracting out” argument in Heller
connected with wider public good arguments against a system of private
arbitration, independently of private law concerns about the specific
bargain itself. For example, Finkin has argued that there are strong policy
arguments in favour of an exclusive jurisdiction for public courts: “the
vindication of legal rights is best reposed in a public body: one whose
competence in the law is assured, whose impartiality is above question,
whose process is transparent, whose decisions are accessible and have
broader legal and communal impact and which is subject to comprehensive
public accountability.”91 Where private arbitration clauses are utilized so
extensively that litigation in public courts disappears, the overall system
of public justice and the rule of law is undermined. In this situation, the
public good would justify a curtailment of private arbitration clauses even
where there is no bargaining unfairness in the individual employment
contract.92 There is perhaps more space in Gardner’s account of private
law enforcement than Ripstein’s to accommodate these public good
arguments, although Ripstein is of course astute to the distinctive virtues
of a system of public justice through courts.
A majority of the SCC upheld the decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal but the justices did so for different reasons. It is possible to
identify two broad approaches in the majority, what could be described as
a “contractual” approach and a “constitutional” approach. Justices Abella
and Rowe (Chief Justice Wagner and Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis,
Martin and Kasirer concurring) exemplified the contractual approach.
90. See Epic Systems Corp v Lewis, 138 S Ct 1612 (2018), where a majority of the US Supreme Court
upheld the preclusion of group claims by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
91. Matthew Finkin, “Privatization of Wrongful Dismissal Protection in Comparative Perspective”
(2008) 37:2 Indus LJ 149 at 164.
92. This is not just a concern in the employment field. Barker, supra note 8 at 18, notes that in the
US “civil cases have all but vanished from the courts.” This creates difficulties for a system of public
justice and the Rule of Law (ibid at 18-19). John Gardner also observes that while “courts do not have
an institutional monopoly on doing justice,” private arbitrators might.“[W]hat the courts do have an
institutional monopoly on is doing justice according to law.” This represents another public good that
must be realized through courts and cannot be realized by private arbitration: John Gardner, “Legal
Justice and Ludic Fairness,” online (pdf): <https://johngardnerathome.info/pdfs/justicefairnessmadrid.pdf> [perma.cc/8TED-Y47F].
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They did so on the basis that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and
hence invalid. Justice Brown favoured a “constitutional” approach. He
rejected the unconscionability analysis of Justices Abella and Rowe on the
basis that it expanded the doctrine beyond its proper limits, leading to an
unacceptable degree of uncertainty for contracting parties. Justice Brown
instead decided the case on the narrower ground of public policy. The
effect of this arbitration clause was to exclude Mr. Heller’s access to an
appropriate forum for a just determination of his legal rights. In impeding
access to justice, the clause undermined the rule of law. This invoked
an established head of public policy, preventing ouster of the courts in
the determination of legal rights, and this was sufficient to impugn the
disputed clause in Heller. It did so without any wider disruptive effects on
the negotiation of contracts, which depend upon a stable and predictable
framework of legal rules.
The doctrine of unconscionability favoured by the majority was based
upon two elements: an (i) inequality of bargaining power resulting in (ii)
an improvident transaction. It should be noted that this represents a wide
approach to unconscionability. Since many employment contracts are now
based on standard form written documentation, they might engage the
“inequality of bargaining power” concern rather easily. The legal analysis
would then shift to an enquiry into whether the specific term or overall
bargain was “improvident.” By contrast, Justice Brown’s constitutional
argument was based on the rule of law, and it connected with public good
arguments against a system of private arbitration. This public rule of law
argument is wider than concerns about the specific bargain itself.
In focusing on the specific public policy issue at stake in the Heller
dispute—the rule of law and effective access to a forum that can adjudicate
disputes about legal rights justly and fairly—Justice Brown’s judgment
provides a more tailored method for scrutinizing the proportionality of
such clauses. Private arbitration would be permissible where it did not
preclude access to justice. The mischief of the specific clause in Heller was
that it was designed to make arbitration inaccessible to the weaker party—
the antithesis of access to justice. Justice Brown’s approach also avoids
difficulties with the unconscionability approach where, for example, the
relevant clause was accompanied by a transparent explanation available
to the party before entering the contract. Here, the deficiencies in the
contracting process may be resolved sufficiently to avoid unconscionability.
The rule of law objection would still stand. Contractual approaches to the
Heller mischief are always vulnerable to circumvention because strong,
well-advised parties can configure the negotiation process to mitigate the
procedural deficiencies just enough to evade the doctrine. The value of the
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“constitutional” perspective is that it is better able to vindicate important
public values, such as the rule of law, that would be missed by a private
law focus on procedural fairness in the individual bargaining process.
The arbitration clause in Heller imposed exorbitant costs on the
Uber driver, which would have had the predictable effect of pricing her
out of access to justice. It is bad enough when private employers do this.
It is grave when governments do so. In the UK, a tribunal fee regime
was implemented by the Coalition Government in 2013. It followed the
publication of a Ministry of Justice consultation paper in January 2011
setting out the Government’s intention to implement fees for Employment
Tribunal (ET) and Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) claims.93 Tribunal
claims dropped off a cliff following its introduction.94 The pattern of
precipitous decline was certainly clear by the time of the second hearing in
the Divisional Court.95 The rapid and drastic real-world impact of tribunal
fees was probably beyond even the wildest dreams of its most fervent
political supporters. Lord Reed concluded that “there has been a dramatic
and persistent fall in the number of claims brought in ETs…of the order
of 66-70%.”96 Furthermore, the remission scheme had not worked as
expected, with the “proportion of claimants receiving remission…far
lower than had been anticipated.”97 The Lord Chancellor’s discretionary
power to remit fees had been exercised only rarely.98 The UKSC also
referred to an Advisory, conciliation and arbitration service (Acas) survey,
published in 2015,99 which found that a significant number of claimants did
not pursue legal claims because of the practical unaffordability of fees.100
The fee regime was struck down as unlawful by the UKSC, principally
on the basis that it violated the common law fundamental right of access
to a court. Prior to the UKSC decision, UNISON had lost three times in
the lower courts. In the lower courts, no judge had been prepared to leap
the slender evidential gap between the aggregate statistics on tribunal
claims to the unaffordability of the fees for individual claimants. Since the
behavioural pattern might be explained on the basis that claimants were
93. UK, Ministry of Justice, Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment
Appeal Tribunal (Consultation Paper) (London: December 2011).
94. For early academic criticism of the fees regime, see KD Ewing & J Hendy QC, “Unfair Dismissal
Law Changes: Unfair?’” (2012) 41:1 Indus LJ 115.
95. R (Unison) v the Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin); [2015] 2 CMLR 4.
96. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 39.
97. Ibid at para 43.
98. Ibid at para 44.
99. Ibid at paras 45-46, discussing Acas, Evaluation of Acas Early Conciliation 2015, Research
Paper (2015), online (pdf): <https://www.acas.org.uk/research-and-commentary> [perma.cc/QSQ65ZH2].
100. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 46.
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unwilling, as opposed to unable to pay, the regime was upheld as lawful.
The legal focus on an individual’s ability to pay is focused on the position
of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the public system of justice, and the
individual citizen as a paying service-user.
By contrast, the UKSC assessed the legality of the fee regime based
on the rule of law as a common good for citizens in the polity. As such,
access to a court was itself a fundamental right contributing to a public
good, not merely a private amenity for individuals to pursue their legal
grievances. There are interesting parallels here with Justice Brown’s
judgment in Heller. As Lord Reed put it, “People and businesses need
to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights
if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet
their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that
knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations.”101
This reflects an ideal of the rule of law as protecting the liberty of citizens
under a system of constitutional government. The law must be “reliably
enforced and fairly and consistently applied” so that civic independence
is assured.102 The common law’s concern with freedom as independence
is especially acute for employees and workers, for ineffective systemic
enforcement entails that “the party in the stronger bargaining position will
always prevail.”103
These constitutional principles emboldened the UKSC to approach the
available evidence differently to the lower courts. The test for whether
the Fees Order was ultra vires was whether there was a “real risk” that
claimants would “effectively be prevented” from having access to the
court.104 This displayed a welcome sensitivity to the real world occupied
by workers. As such, the formula of “real risk” meant that it was not
necessary to adduce “conclusive evidence” that people were prevented
from bringing claims. The aggregate data was sufficient to establish
a fall that was “so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant
the conclusion that a significant number of people who would otherwise
have brought claims have found the fees to be unaffordable.”105 This was
reinforced by Lord Reed’s observation that affordability must be decided

101. Ibid at para 71.
102. TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 89. This has obvious affinities with republican work on freedom as
non-domination, on which see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
103. UNISON, supra note 87 at para 72.
104. Ibid at para 87 [emphasis added].
105. Ibid at para 91.
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“according to the likely impact of the fees on behaviour in the real world.”106
As such, the fees needed to be “reasonably” affordable, not theoretically
affordable.107 Finally, Lord Reed drew attention to statutory rights where
the corresponding remedies were either low monetary awards or even nonpecuniary, such as the right to written statement of terms and conditions. In
these circumstances, the costs of seeking justice would render its pursuit
“futile or irrational.”108 Even where claimants were seeking to vindicate
statutory rights with higher monetary awards, the difficulties in predicting
a successful outcome, compounded by the shocking figures on nonenforcement of ET awards, meant that enforcement was likely “irrational
or futile” in many of these cases too.109 This undermined the public good
represented by the effective general enforcement of each individual’s
employment rights.
These public systemic considerations were extremely important
in justifying the Court’s conclusion that the fees regime was unlawful.
Enforcement is a site where the “public” and the “private” intersect. The
insight that systemic enforcement is a public good also supports the view
that exclusive reliance on individual litigation, even without excessive
court fees and supported by generous legal aid, is unlikely to be enough.
Effective enforcement must be sensitive to a range of considerations. John
Gardner’s recent work identifies the range of considerations relevant to
this enquiry. It also identifies the limits of normative argument, for many
of the final judgements will be informed by empirical work on the real
world effects of specific models such as standing for trade union enforcers,
the practical limitations of public agency enforcement in areas such as
national minimum wage, blending criminal and civil law measures, and
so forth.
Conclusion: Employment law as a hybrid of private and public law
The arguments in “Subset” have stood the test of time. They could even
be regarded as ahead of their time. Individual employment rights have
become increasingly important in providing a basic facilitative structure
for collective activities in the workplace, particularly in precarious forms
of work that appear to be excluded from standard labour law protections.
There has been a greater willingness to use innovative private law
arguments in litigation, for example the sham doctrine in the English
106. Ibid at para 93.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid at para 96.
109. See further Abi Adams & Jeremias Prassl, “Vexatious Claims: Challenging the Case for
Employment Tribunal Fees” (2017) 80:3 Mod L Rev 412.
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law on employment status or unconscionability in the Canadian Uber
litigation. “Subset” also identified enforcement architectures as a central
issue in employment and labour law. Over the last decade, issues around
enforcement have moved to the centre of public policy discourse, and the
arguments in “Subset” speak powerfully to our current challenges.
There is more difficulty in the claim that the “public” should have
normative priority over the “private.” In fact, many of the arguments in
“Subset” point towards a more nuanced understanding of the “public” and
the “private.” It contemplates a richer and more complex vision, whereby
public and private values intersect in a multiplicity of ways. Employment
law, based upon corrective justice between employee right-holders and
employer duty-bearers, partakes of the basic structural elements of private
right. There is a dignity in being taken seriously as an individual bearer
of rights in a public court.110 The enforcement of employment law, and
particularly the involvement of actors other than the individual rightholder in enforcement, inevitably engages questions that are more public in
nature. In the course of reflecting on “Subset,” I have indicated some ways
in which recent work in private law theory illuminates some of the most
fascinating enforcement puzzles in modern employment law. We need to
keep the “public” and the “private” in view, and give full recognition to the
internal complexity of these ideas. To do otherwise is to do employment
law (and the workers who benefit from its protection) a disservice.
In particular, it is important that labour lawyers reconnect with private
lawyers so that scholars in both domains can learn from each other. It
is also important that labour law theory is engaged with work in private
law theory. In retrospect, it may be that Langille’s strong commitment
to the “primacy of public values” was a rhetorical defence anticipating
predictable criticisms that the “primacy of employment law” was a
betrayal of collective and solidaristic values. While such worries on the
author’s part would have been perfectly understandable, the criticism
that the “primacy of employment law” is a betrayal would be wide of the
mark. The spirit of its arguments should be read as expanding the circle
of solidarity so that the “have-nots” sit at the centre of our discipline,
exactly where they belong. Private law doctrines, values and theory can
contribute to improving the position of the “have-nots,” recognizing their
dignity as bearers of rights. As labour lawyers, we overlook those private
law resources at our peril, and to the heavy cost of those most in need of
protection. Yet this must always be tempered by a recognition that the
public institutions of the state, such as courts and labour inspectorates,
110. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, & Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

“Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” Revisited

513

must perform an important public role in securing the enforcement of
workers’ fundamental rights. In employment law, at least, the public and
the private stand or fall together. And employment law is best understood
as a hybrid of private and public law.
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